CHAPTER
V
REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS
Since the San Francisco Conference, the Colombian
delegation, presided by Alberto Lleras Camargo, fought a tough battle
to preserve the regional organization and to avoid that the Security
Council could be directly consulted without going first to it.
Many factors were involved in this position:
first, the Hemisphere had the oldest international organization, which
in spite of its defects and deficiencies, was at last consolidated,
as the Chapultepec Meeting held just before the San Francisco Conference
showed. At that meeting, at which Colombia´s leadership was
undebatable, important agreements were reached for hemispheric defense.
In Latin America valuable theories had been developed in International
Law, especially with the concept of non-intervention. Moreover, due
to North American interest in having allies in this hemisphere and
not enemies in the event of a world conflict and as the product of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt´s good neighbor policy, Latin America
had achieved progress in the face of the long standing American tradition
of intervening militarily in the region. Furthermore, juridical equality
among states was recognized in the regional organization, while the
privilege of veto was not.
In addition, maintaining hemispheric issues within
the sphere of the Regional Body implied, for Latin America, protecting
the region from the Soviet veto in the United Nations at a time of
profound ideological confrontation. Chapter VIII of the San Francisco
Charter is entitled "Regional Agreements" and includes the
following articles:
"Article 52-1. Nothing in this present Charter
precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing
with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace
and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that
such arrangements or agencies, and their activities are consistent
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements
or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements of
by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific
settlement of local disputes through such regional agencies either
on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the
Security Council.
4. This article in no way impairs the application of articles 34 and
35.
Article 53.- 1. The Security Council shall, where
appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization
of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any
enemy state as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for
pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against
renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until
such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned,
be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression
by such a state.
2. The term "enemy state" as used in paragraph 1 of this
Article applies to any state which during Second World War has been
an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.
Article 54.- The Security Council shall at all
times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance
of international peace and security".
The inclusion of said measures implied an arduous
debate and a strong struggle in which the Latin American group played
a decisive role. And within this group, Alberto Lleras Camargo, who
presided the Commission and who had been the author of the proposal
for the Chapultepec Act, was a central figure. The organization agreed
to in Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks did not contemplate the participation
of small countries in future decisions.
The plan approved at Dumbarton Oaks among the
four great powers (United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain and
China, - France was not invited-), foresaw an organization directed
by them alone as permanent members of the Security Council. The reserved
to themselves the monopoly of declaring war, determining the existence
of threats to the peace and any violation of it. Paragraph 4 of Section
B, Chapter VIII, prepared at Dumbarton Oaks, stated: "All members
of the Organization must promise to accept the decisions of the Security
Council and to put them into practice in accordance with the provisions
of the Organization's By-laws". There was here no room for regional
organizations. "But this pronounced universalism was vigorously
combated before and during the San Francisco Conference by 72% of
the participants, by ecclesiastical institutions (Protestant, Jewish
and Catholic churches) as well as by various individuals throughout
the world". Among the twenty Latin American and six Arab countries
that agreed to include the regional organizations, more than half
were in favor, since 50 originally participated in San Francisco.
The regional thesis could have been broadened and the complete autonomy
of Regional Organizations could have been stipulated, as required
by the Latin American delegations had they obtained the support of
Europeans and Soviets, "But the latter and more particularly
the Europeans, obsessed with the example of the society of Nations,
showed themselves to be distrustful of autonomous regional organizations".
Alberto Lleras Camargo sustained the Latin American
position in the following terms:
"The intentions of Dumbarton Oaks were based
on a practical and precise evaluation of this truth: small nations
cannot guarantee the peace and security of the world; only the large
ones can do it. We all agree, but the bases of this assertion lie
in the fact that only the great powers can threaten the peace and
security of the world… But Colombia, just like the remaining
countries of America that expressed their thoughts in the Resolutions
of Mexico City, feels confident of the United Nations will for peace,
whether large or small, victorious in this war. Colombia believes,
in general, that the Dumbarton Oaks mechanism will ensure a long although
provisional peace. Colombia believes that the generation that suffered
through this war and directed it, is capable of preserving the peace.
But it also believes that this system is a compromise, as stated previously
between the realities of 1945 and the aspirations of mankind. No state
can think otherwise given that the Interamerican system that works
thus, of course on a less complex continent, unquestionably functions
better. The Interamerican system prohibits all types of violence,
all acquisition of territory by force, all interventions or interferences
by one country I the internal affairs of others, all aggression and
above all it unequivocally defines the aggressor."
Modifications made to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals
in San Francisco in reference to Article 52 of the Charter, consisted
of adding paragraphs 2 and 4, which were unanimously approved. Alberto
Lleras thus explained the intention of the article approved and the
procedure to follow, as noted in the Minutes of the Session of Committee
III/4 of May 23, 1945:
"The procedure to follow for peaceful settlement
and application of security measures within regional agreements and
according to modifications adopted is the following:
In the event a controversy should arise between two member states
of a regional organization, said controversy shall be solved by the
peaceful means established within said organization. All member states
of a regional organization are obliged to make all efforts to achieve
settlement of the controversy by means of this organization and at
the same time the Security Council is obliged to promote peaceful
regional settlements. But the Security Council likewise has the right
to investigate whether the controversy may become a threat to international
peace or security, while this right to investigate is subject to the
limitations indicated in the new article on collective defense, which
establishes that articles 1 and 2 of Section A of the same Chapter
remain fully effective. (Arts. 34 and 35 of the Charter). These articles
refer to the right the Security Council has to investigate any situation
that can threaten peace and security, and the right that nations have
to call to the attention of the Security Council or the Assembly any
situation that may threaten international peace and security.
In accordance with articles 1 and 2 of Section
A, the Council only has jurisdiction to investigate, and the nations,
whether they be members of the Organization or not, only have the
right to request such investigation. The Council has jurisdiction
to take all types of measures, to make recommendations, to adopt provisions
aimed at avoiding war, to apply all coercive measures other than military
actions and to take military measures only within the terms established
in Section A, beginning with article 4 and Section B (Chapter VII
of the Charter). Therefore, there can be no double jurisdiction between
that of the Security Council when it proposes particular peaceful
settlements of controversies and that of the regional organizations.
The Council must limit itself to investigating, whether it be by its
own initiative or by request of any country, any situation susceptible
to threatening the peace and it must promote the settlement of the
problem through the regional system while the member states of the
regional system have the obligation to make all efforts to reach a
peaceful agreement through their own organization prior to taking
the problem to the Council. This is specified not only in the articles
of the Chapter on regional settlements, but also in Articles 3 of
modified Section A (Art. 33 of the Charter).
All regional agreements must include, as in the
case of the American States, a complete system for peaceful settlements,
such as investigation, direct settlement, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration and recourse to regional system must be resolved by means
of peaceful regional measures. According to Article 1 of Section A
of Chapter VIII, the Security Council, whether said measures have
not been taken, or whether it acts on its own initiative or at the
request of any State, according to Article 2, it must only try to
determine whether or not a situation exists that tends to affect international
peace and security".
Once World War II had ended and the United Nations
was in operation, steps were taken toward the consolidation of the
regional system on the American Continent, within the framework of
Interamericanism. In furtherance of Resolution VII of the Chapultepec
Conference on war problems and peace in relation to reciprocal aid,
and Interamerican Conference was held in Rio de Janeiro for maintaining
peace and security. On September 2, 1947 as a culmination of this
conference the Reciprocal Aid Treaty, known as TIAR, was signed. The
following year in Bogotá at the XI Interamerican Conference
the Organization of American States (OAS) was formally established
and an Interamerican system of peaceful solutions was agreed upon.
Colombia joined these organizations within the
parameters of the San Francisco Charter, which based on articles 53
and 54, expressly authorizes regional organizations, grants them autonomy
with respect to the peaceful settlement of controversies, foresees
the use of them to take coercive measures and empowers them to exercise
the right to legitimate defense in the case of armed attack against
any member thereof.
With a retrospective view of a half century,
it can be seen that in America the solution of conflicts was remitted
to the Regional Organization. Nevertheless, over time processes have
evolved. Let us take a brief look:
On July 19, 1954, the Guatemalan government went
directly to the Security Council requesting it to act in view of the
fact that the very same day an armed group form Honduras had attacked
its territory. During the Security Council session of the following
day, the Colombian and Brazilian delegations presented a resolution
proposal remitting the problem to the Regional Organization, that
is to the Organization of American States, for it to take measures
and inform back to the Council. This resolution was vetoed by the
Soviet Union and instead an amendment presented by France was approved,
asking for immediate end to all actions that could imply any bloodshed
and urged all members of the United Nations to abstain from lending
aid to actions of this type. The French proposal implied that by making
a statement on the issue, the Council assumed knowledge of the controversy,
to which the Colombian and Brazilian delegates expressed their opposition
because it would imply they were ignoring the regional action prescribed
in the Charter. The French delegate accepted modifying his original
proposal by introducing a paragraph that said: "… without
impairment to the measures adopted by the Organization of American
States, that immediate end be put to all activity…", and
the resolution was thus approved. In the end, the matter was handled
by the Regional Organization.
The Colombian position as to the role of the
Regional Organization within the framework of the Charter, with respect
to the conflict in Guatemala, was stated by the Alternate Colombian
Ambassador to the Security Council, Carlos Echeverri Cortés,
in these terms:
"Since the San Francisco Conference it has
been of concern to the Colombian delegation to avoid the matter going
directly to the Security Council without being considered first by
the regional organization, because in such a case, any action on the
continent to repel aggression would be subject to the veto. This view
was shared by all the American delegations and was written into Chapter
VIII of the United Nations Charter. According to article 33 of the
United Nations Charter, the parties to a controversy which places
maintenance of international peace and security in jeopardy if continued,
must seek a solution, and among these the possibility of resorting
to `regional agreements or organizations` is mentioned. This article
must taken in conjunction with article 52, which is even more imperative,
given that in clause 2 it establishes that `all possible efforts to
achieve a peaceful settlement of local controversies must be attempted
by means of said regional agreements or organizations, before submitting
them to the Security Council`.
I would like to be very clear in that the provisions
of article 52, clause 2 of the United Nations Charter, impose upon
the members the obligation to go before the regional organization
first. It is a first instance obligatory jurisdiction, not a waivable
right, given that all States submitted themselves to said obligation
by signing the Charter.
Therefore, if a controversy becomes known to
the Security Council, according to article 35 of the Charter, it must
be referred to the regional organization, according to the commitment
acquired in article 37, by which the Security Council may act only
with full cognizance when the regional organization has failed".
It could be said that in the decade of the sixties,
one of the main concerns of Hemispheric policy was Cuba. On the one
hand, there was a bilateral conflict between Cuba and the United States,
and on the other, a situation of confrontation between the former
and the majority of the Latin American countries due to the policy
of Fidel Castro of exporting revolution. These matters were dealt
with principally in the OAS at the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs held in Punta del Este, 1962, San José and Washington,
1964, Cuba (the government, not the country) was expulsed and diplomatic,
consular and economic relation were suspended by all countries, except
Mexico. Colombia played a key role in these events through President
Alberto Lleras Camargo's (1958-1962) Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Doctors Jose Joaquin Caicedo Castilla and Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala
and President Guillermo León Valencia`s (1962-1966) Fernando
Gómez Martínez.
On July 19, 1960, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Cuba addressed a note to the Chairman of the Security Council in
which he accused the United States of practicing economic aggression
and intervening in Cuba's internal affairs and for that reason requested
that the Council consider the situation and adopt appropriate measures.
The Council met to listen to Cuban statements, those by the U.S. and
other members. At the July 19th session, a resolution presented by
Argentina and Ecuador was approved by nine votes in favor, two abstentions
and none against. This resolution decided to suspend consideration
of the matter until a report from the Organization of American States
were received, and at the same time, invited the Organization to lend
it assistance in seeking a peaceful solution.
During the XXVI General Assembly of 1961, Cuba
presented a petition to include the topic of aggression of its territory
by the United States on the agenda. Colombia objected with the argument
expressed by Ambassador German Zea Hernandez, to the effect that it
was a case of bilateral policy between two American states, and therefore
should be dealt with in the regional sphere.
At the request of the Cuban government presented
to the President of the Security Council, the latter body was urgently
convened on January 4th and 5th, 1961 to examine a claim made by Cuba
against the U.S. for imminent military aggression against its territory.
But following an intense debate, the Council adjourned without having
adopted any resolution. Colombia insisted on managing the Cuban matter
within the framework of the OAS. In his speech to the General Assembly
in October, 1961, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Julio
Cesar Turbay Ayala, referred to these issues in the following terms:
"The effectiveness of legal norms and policies
in the Interamerican system has been thoroughly proven and it must
be appealed to in order to prevent our regional problems from unnecessarily
occupying a position on the Assembly or Council agenda when there
are still positive forms of recourse before the regional organization.
When prematurely brought to the consideration of the UN it can only
stimulate debates that per force involve the American continent within
the objectives of the Cold War. This might have happened with the
case of Cuba, which Colombia wished to see treated, and hopefully
solved, within the limits of existing Interamerican agreements with
the participation of the regional bodies most capable of taking concrete
measures wherever a threat to hemispheric peace and security may exist".
Since 1992, Cuba has presented a resolution entitled
"The need to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo
imposed by the United States against Cuba" to the plenary session
of the General Assembly. Resolution 49/9 of October 26, 1994 won 101
votes in favor, 2 against and 48 abstentions. Colombia voted in favor
of it, as it had done in the past and the votes against were by the
United States and Israel.
This resolution recalls the principles of sovereign
equality among States, non-intervention and non-interference in the
internal affairs of States and freedom of international navigation
and trade. These principles are, furthermore, established in a number
of legal instruments of both domestic and international character.
During the sixties, in cases occurring on the
America continent, the Security Council continued in this position
and it was the Regional Organization that led them to it. During the
Haiti affair of May, 1963, "… the Security Council likewise
refused to apply article 52 paragraph 4, by virtue of which the government
of Haiti had presented a claim against the Dominican Republic. In
the Panama issue of January, 1964, a case of armed aggression by the
Untied Nations, the Security Council adopted the Brazilian resolution
proposal which demanded a cease fire and referral of the controversy
to the OAS in accordance with article 52, paragraphs 2 and 3".
Nonetheless, during the seventies the situation
gradually became modified. Until that time, during the Cold War, Latin
America and particularly Colombia, had been firmly aligned behind
U.S. policy within the framework of Interamericanism handled in the
Organization of American States. But the context began to change.
The Cold War gave way to a distensioning; the bipolar world suffered
a transformation as the Soviet sphere weakened and broke apart with
the Sino-Soviet split and with the growth of People´s Republic
of China and its admission to the United Nations as a permanent member
of the Security Council. The Western block also underwent transformations
and Europe pulled out of its post-war prostration to become and economic
power. The defeated countries of the Second World War, Germany and
Japan, shifted from enemies to allies of the West and to play a role
in line with their resurrection. In Latin America, the OAS began to
languish and the situation of dictatorial governments in the great
majority of Latin American countries was reflected in their representation
before the Regional Organization, even in the very highest spheres.
For this reason, when widespread conflicts arose in the hemisphere,
matters were gradually transferred for solution to different arenas
other than the Regional Organization. These were the cases of the
claim Panama lodged against the United Nations due to the Canal Zone,
the Falkland Island War, in which the conception of hemispheric protection
crumbled in the face of U.S. alignment alongside England; or the situation
of war and instability in Central America, which required a creative
subregional type arrangement with the support of the United Nations
and the European community, but no longer Pan American in nature.
When General Torrijos claimed the rights of this
country over the Canal Zone and the Canal and achieved a meeting of
the Security Council in Panama, the Colombian position had been modified
with respect to the points of view it had sustained in previous conflicts,
according to which these should be remitted to the Regional Organization.
In his speech to the General Assembly in September, 1973, Foreign
Minister Alfredo Vásquez Carrisoza stated the country´s
position as follows:
" The Republic of Panama posed its problem
directly to the United Nations because the complexity of the procedure
in the Interamerican Regional Organization would have impede it and
the Security Council showed it was accessible to the concerns of the
peoples within the new global concept of international policy.
We are witnessing a crisis of regional organizations
due to the tendency toward globalism and to the extent that these
organizations were conceived upon termination of the Second World
War to take care of Cold War problems and the confrontations of block
policy.
Security treaties formed as defensive alliances
for Cold War situations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
of 1949, as well as the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
Treaty among socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact of 1955 have been
left hanging as isolated entities and require a readjustment in the
face of new cooperation situations in the European area; not to mention
the security treaties of the Middle East, which circumstances have
undone. In the Interamerican system, our Reciprocal Assistance Treaty
covers a much broader range of objectives. But aside from this instrument,
we confront economic problems that the regional organization cannot
solve.
All regional systems, for one reason or another,
are in the process of revision due to the effects of a global policy
that is making beadway in the world. In the future, regionalism will
have to be much more compatible with universalism and, doubtlessly,
act as a product thereof. At least that is what we think in Colombia
and other Western Hemisphere countries, in order not to dissociate
them with special rules from what happens in other parts of the world.
It is well to remember that at the United Nations Conference in San
Francisco, Latin America claimed the legitimacy for its own organization,
and this was the purpose of article 102 of the Regional Charter adopted
in Bogotá in 1948. None of the provisions of this Charter,
states article 102, will be interpreted as undermining the rights
and obligations of the Member States according to the United Nations
Charter.
The future of these organizations and of the
Interamerican one in particular, will depend on the way they want
to adapt and can adapt to new circumstances in an evolving world in
which the great political agreements are sought outside the ideologies
and when it becomes senseless that the Cold War has ended in the relations
among the great powers and must continue in Latin America, with remnants
jealously guarded from the times of confrontation".
In the following administration, that of Alfonso
López Michelsen (1970-1974), Bogotá would be a key city
for conversations leading to the Torrijos-Carter Treaty and the support
Colombia gave was basic in Panama's making its rights respected. As
Minister of Foreign Affairs for President Carlos Lleras Restrepo,
López Michelsen had pronounced the slogan "respice similia",
that is, look toward your kind, as a ruling slogan of Colombian foreign
policy. This implied a modification o rectification of foreign policy
following by Colombia since the beginnings of the XX century under
the slogan of "respice polum" look towards the pole, alluding
to the United States. During his administration, López Michelsen
"…sough greater unity with Latin America, a certain distance
from the United States and the projection of national interest that
was not marked by traditional anti-communism". In relation to
the Panama Canal, Presidents Alfonso López Michelsen of Colombia,
Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica, Carlos Andrés Pérez of
Venezuela and Omar Torrijos of Panama met on March 24, 1975 and published
a document known as the "Contadora Act", to support the
negotiation process between Panama and the United States.
Colombia´s return to Central America was
thus consolidated during the López Michelsen administration
by means of strengthening the country´s relations which had
historically defined Colombia´s distance from the subregion:
Panama. With active participation in the Torrijos-Carter and the definition
of ocean areas with Central American countries and the Caribbean islands,
Colombia established the bases of a growing process of involvement
in the zone´s issues, which in many and diverse aspects affect
Colombia´s national interests. Foreign policy during the next
eight years encouraged a more visible and central role for Colombia
in the area, even though the principal topics, orientations and relations
changed notably from one administration to the next".
Julio Cesar Turbay´s administration (1974-1978)
did not alter its policy toward Panama, a country with which it signed
the Uribe Vargas -Ozores Treaty on August 22, 1979, in order to ensure
Colombia´s benefits in using the Canal, and as a consequence
of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty. On the other hand, Colombia kept its
interest in Central American through the Andean Group. With Venezuela´s
President, Carlos Andrés Pérez, Turbay Ayala sent a
message to the United Nations in September, 1978 questioning Somoza´s
regime and in June, 1979, the Andean governments together with Mexico
and Costa Rica objected to "… an attempt by President Carter
through the Organization of American States to send a type of ´multilateral
peace force´ to Nicaragua".
The Presidency of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986)
implied a profound change with respect to the patterns that had shaped
Colombia´s foreign policy in this century. Above all, its relations
with the United States underwent a reformulation, as a result of Colombia´s
entry into the non-aligned movement and the impetus it gave to the
Contadora Group. This, in its conception, was profoundly different
from the interamericanism that had shaped hemispheric relations during
the century, especially since the creation of the UN and the OAS.
The Contadora Group was created in January, 1983 and was formed by
Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. The Contadora Group, in the
formation and development of which President Belisario Betancur played
a key role, took as its basic premise the paralysis and disaccrediting
of the Regional Organization, that is the OAS, incapable of acting
in the face of such deep conflict as that Central America was suffering.
On the other hand, its philosophy, as noted above, was the antithesis
of Pan Americanism. This implied the participation of all the hemisphere´s
countries, including obviously the United the United States, in the
solution of regional conflicts. To the contrary, Contadora was a Latin
American answer to those problems, many of which were derived from
the rivalries of the two super powers, making it necessary to solve
them outside it.
In the words of Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, Belisario
Betancur´s Minister of Foreign Affairs when the Contadora Group
came into being and grew:
"Contadora intends to be a long term policy
for Latin America. It is very important to realize that if we can
look for our own solutions to our problems, or on the other hand,
we are condemned to schemes of economic and political dependency,
important in overcoming development or eluding East-West polarity.
In the Central American phenomenon there are
ingredients of both conflicts: in the critical problems of underdevelopment
a reflection of Norty-South incomprehension, as a consequence of the
industrialized world´s blindness. But also in military confrontation
and in the foreign presence symptoms of the East-West conflict can
be seen. Central America is a victim of both phenomena and must struggle
alongside other developing nations to overcome the injustices that
are inherent in the North-South scheme and the dangers derived from
the East-West confrontation. We could add that this Latin American
policy gives us the possibility to forge a more authentic position
in the international sphere that will allow us to reduce and eventually
eliminate the factors of submission. We must do this with objective
criteria, given we live in the world and we cannot escape its realities.
But we can indeed advance toward a restatement of our own convictions.
After 150 years, it is time to strengthen the
foundations of Latin American unity and set new parameters in our
relation with the United States in order to indicate to them that
this is not their ´back yard´, but a subcontinent of free
nations that have their own dimensions".
In contrast to what happened with the regional
conflicts of the fifties and sixties, the later tendency was to solve
them outside the Regional Organization, whether in bilateral form
or with the aid of countries in the region and the presence of the
United Nations, such as in the case of the Panama Canal, or with the
participation of groups in the region such as the Andean Pact in the
case of Nicaragua. With Contadora this was the formula: the countries
of the region must settle their problems outside the OAS and with
the participation of the Untied Nations, and even the Security Council.
There is a great gap between the words of Ambassador Echeverri Cortés
quoted in reference to the Cuban problem, with those of Augusto Ramírez
Ocampo, Belisario Betancur´s Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered
to the General Assembly in 1984:
"We come to the United Nations hoping to
seek support for this organization that was created, precisely to
preserve peace…
In this same way, the members of the Contadora
Group, in furtherance of the mandate conferred last year, have informed
the Secretary General of the United Nations on work done and have
related the progress of conversations. For this purpose, we propose
additionally to summon the Security Council in order to fulfill the
decisions expressed in resolutions issued by that organization.
As a corollary to my words, Contadora Group must
present a resolution proposal to be discussed in the heart of the
General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of Resolution A/38/L.13
revision 1, called the Central American Situation: Threats to International
Peace and Security".
The Central American topic was on the UN General
Assembly agenda since 1983 and also in the Security Council. Colombia,
as a member of this Council during the period 1989-1991, was very
closely linked to the processes dealing with Central America. In June,
1989, in informal consultations with the Security Council, the Colombian
delegation as the only Latin American country of the non-aligned group,
worked with the support of CAUCUS in the preparation of a resolution
proposal to provide incentives for peace in Central America. The Security
Council approved Resolution 637 on July 27, 1989, which backed the
action of the five Central American presidents, supported the good
offices mission of the Secretary General in the region, and established
the need to hold free elections in Nicaragua and suspended the aid
third countries were giving the insurgent or irregular forces in the
region. At the same time, Colombia propitiated a meeting of the Central
American presidents which was held on the 10th and 11th of December,
1989 according to the philosophy that inspired the Contadora Group
to solve conflicts of the zone in the regional and Latin American
sphere. Ambassador Enrique Peñalosa, as President of the Security
Council, stated: "Council Members consider that the five Central
American presidents are the ones who are primarily responsible for
searching for solutions to the region´s problems, in accordance
with the Esquipulas agreements". Resolution 644 dated November
7, 1989, on the Central American situation, the text of which creates
ONUCA (UN Observation Group from Central America), was unanimously
adopted. Colombia took part in ONUCA with a group of officers.
In short, Colombia´s participation in the
consolidation of peace in Central America gains force with its active
presence in the Contadora Group and its contribution to the process
that would lead in 1987 to the signing of the Esquipulas II agreements.
The Group of Friends of the Secretary General was born from recommendations
made at the meeting held between the government of El Salvador and
the FMLN, in Geneva in 1990 and the precedent of the request made
by the Central American chancellors at their meeting in Mexico, November
30, 1988, addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Colombia, Spain, Mexico and Venezuela worked as a consulting and support
team carrying the peace process to a successful conclusion. The Group´s
contribution was acknowledge in the Security Council resolutions related
to the topic, and in some of the General Assembly´s this work
was also praised. In mid 1991, the Security Council established a
UN Observer´s Mission in El Salvador, ONUSAL, and on January
16th of the following year a peace agreement between the El Salvador
government and the FMLN was signed in Chapultepec, Mexico.
When Colombia occupied the Presidency of the
Security Council it had to confront a situation that endangered world
security. On December 19, 1989, 22,500 U.S. soldiers initiated the
invasion of Panamanian territory. In order to justify its actions,
the U.S. invoked article 51 of the UN Charter in an attempt to describe
the matter as a case of legitimate defense. According to the United
States, its actions was a response to armed attacks by forces headed
by Manuel Antonio Noriega. Prior to the invasion, Panama had filed
a complaint before the Security Council of a series of U.S. actions
that it considered to be violating its sovereignty.
Nicaragua requested that a Security Council session
be convened and it was thus held on December 20th. The representatives
of Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, China, France, Great Britain, Canada
and the United States took part. The Soviet representative asked the
invasion be condemned, which as he said, constituted "a flagrant
violation of the most elementary rules of international law and the
United Nations Charter". The Representative of France appeared
to be relatively neutral, "Canada lamented the U.S. attitude
at the beginning of its speech, although it ended by saying that ´they
were justified in acting as they did´, and in the same way,
but more emphatically, the representative of Great Britain stated
that ´we fully support the action taken by the United States".
The Non-Aligned countries, members of the Security Council (Algeria,
Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and Yugoslavia) prepared
a resolution proposal (S/21048) presented at the December 23, 1989
session. The project confirmed the "sovereign and inalienable
right of Panama to freely determine its social, economic and political
regime and to maintain international relations without any type of
intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or foreign threat".
Prior to voting, Ambassador Enrique Peñalosa, who presided
the Security Council, stated the Colombian position:
"Colombia has traditionally rallied behind
the principle of non intervention and the non use of force in international
relations. For this reason we deplore the intervention in Panama of
U.S. armed forces, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international
law and independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.
We consider that there can be no reason, not
even on a temporary basis for a State to be the object of military
occupation or other measures based on force by another State.
For this reason, we urge an immediate stop to
the intervention in Panama. The Panamanian people have the inalienable
right to self-determination without internal impositions nor external
interferences… Colombia has promoted and will continue to promote
different initiatives for the reestablishment of representative democracy
in this country, based on consultation and understanding among the
different Panamanian sectors".
The resolution proposal was submitted to a vote
and won 10 votes in favor, Colombia´s among them, one abstention
(Finland) and 4 against (Canada, France, Great Britain and the United
States). Therefore it failed to pass due to the veto of the last three
States mentioned.
Although the topic of the elections in Haiti
in 1990, the year in which Colombia sat on the Security Council, was
never formally taken before the Council, it was in fact the subject
of discussion in informal consultation. The issue of electoral process
in Haiti came up among the members of the Security Council because
the Secretary General, during informal consultation, made known a
letter from the provisional President of Haiti in which he expressed
the need for a UN force to verify and oversee the electoral process.
Colombia criticized the petition form the Secretary General to send
armed observers to protect the experts. On the other hand, the CARICOM
countries sent a letter to the Chairman of the Security Council in
which they requested participation by the obligatory nature of the
Council´s decisions, a decision to that effect would have granted
it a disproportionate power, beyond that authorized in the Charter.
Colombia, like other members, expressed its position according to
which, and in line with the Charter, the Council must only intervene
when international peace and security are at stake, which was not
then the case. For Colombia, it was an exclusive internal matter that
in on way implied danger to international peace and security. In the
end, the insistence of the Colombia delegation had an influence on
the decision to deal with Haiti´s electoral situation in the
General Assembly and not in the Security Council. The Assembly decided
to reopen an examination of the topic on Haiti, which prevented it
from being brought up in the Security Council, given that the same
topic may not be simultaneously treated by both bodies.
Then the coup d´état against President
Aristide occurred and the repeated fruitless efforts of the OAS to
reinstate the constitutional president. Within the OAS, during the
"Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs", the resolution
was approved by means of which it was decided to:
"…Give a mandate to the Secretary General
of the Organization of American States to take action within the framework
of the Charter in search of a peaceful solution to the Haitian crisis
and in contact with the Secretary General of the United Nations, explore
the possibilities and convenience of taking the Haitian situation
before the Security Council of the United Nations in order to achieve
universal application of the commercial blockade recommended by the
OAS.
…Request the Secretary General to forward
this resolution to the Secretary General or the United Nations and
that it be given broad dissemination".
OAS positions were very far form this to be able
to keep management of hemispheric conflicts within the regional organization.
The call to the Security Council of the United Nations was a confirmation
of its impotence. Later development in the reinstatement of President
Aristide in his position is well known: at the urging of the United
States and international force was created under the auspices of the
United Nations to intervene in Haiti. And this occurred in spite of
the fact, as Colombia had stated, that it was an internal issue that
did not imperil either world peace or security, as required by the
San Francisco Charter for the United Nations to be able to intervene.
The result was that for the first time in the history of America,
a multilateral military force with components form outside the continent,
acted in a country of this hemispher, under the supervision of the
United Nations Organization.
